The dispute that raged between Thomas Hobbes and John Wallis from 1655 until Hobbes's death in 1679 was one of the most intense of the 'battles of the books' in seventeenth-century intellectual life. The dispute was principally centered on geometric questions (most notably Hobbes's many failed attempts to square the circle), but it also involved questions of religion and politics. This paper investigates the origins of the dispute and argues that Wallis's primary motivation was not so much to refute Hobbes's geometry as to demolish his reputation as an authority in political, philosophical, and religious matters. It also highlights the very different conceptions of geometrical methodology employed by the two disputants. In the end, I argue that, although Wallis was successful in showing the inadequacies of Hobbes's geometric endeavours, he failed in his quest to discredit the Hobbesian philosophy in toto.
The dispute that raged between Thomas Hobbes and John Wallis from 1655 until Hobbes's death in 1679 was one of the most intense of the 'battles of the books' in seventeenthcentury intellectual life. The quarrel began over geometric matters, when Wallis published a lengthy refutation of the mathematics in Hobbes's 1655 treatise De corpore under the title Elenchus geometriae hobbianae.
1 A large part of the significance of this dispute comes from the fact that it involved two of the most influential figures in the English Republic of Letters. On one side was Hobbes, whose 1651 masterwork Leviathan had solidified his reputation as a political thinker and controversial proponent of the 'new philosophy', but who saw his once-considerable scientific and mathematical credentials demolished in the course of the dispute. On the other was Wallis, whose status as Oxford's Savilian Professor of Geometry and founding member of the Royal Society put him very much at the centre of the English scientific scene. Yet his participation in the quarrel did not measurably enhance his intellectual standing.
Hobbes claimed that his principles had enabled him to solve the great unsolved problems of geometry-notably the quadrature of the circle, the arbitrary section of an angle and the duplication of the cube. 2 In support of his claims for the superiority of his geometry Hobbes included a circle quadrature and various other geometric efforts in his De corpore; when Wallis promptly refuted these in his Elenchus, Hobbes replied with revised efforts and mounted a vigorous counterattack against Wallis's own geometric principles. The ensuing exchange of polemics acquired a life of its own, and Hobbes found his geometric efforts almost universally scorned. In a futile attempt to preserve his imagined results from refutation, Hobbes rejected the basic principles on which his opponents' arguments were based, but his geometric programme collapsed into incoherence as he found himself forced to question such basics as the Pythagorean Theorem, the validity of the traditional trigonometric tables or the Archimedean bounds for the value of p. Viewing the wreckage to which Wallis had reduced Hobbes's geometric argumentation, Christiaan Huygens wondered why he had even bothered to expose the errors and incoherence in Hobbes's geometry. Writing to Wallis in 1656, Huygens declared himself 'amazed that you judged [Hobbes] worthy of such a lengthy refutation, although I read your learned and rather sharp Elenchus with some pleasure'. 3 This was, in all respects, a very public debate, and it focused on issues where one might not initially expect a controversy, namely technical questions of mathematics and the adequacy of proposed demonstrations. Public disputes and debates typically have a political aspect, and this was no exception as it involved matters of political obligation and church governance in addition to questions of mathematics. Yet it would be a serious misinterpretation to think that the controversy was entirely political, or entirely religious, or entirely mathematical. The episode illustrates the interplay among a variety of factors, and it cannot be reduced to questions of pure geometry or pure politics.
My purpose here is to address two questions. First, what was ultimately at stake in this dispute? Second, what consequences did the dispute have both for Hobbes and Wallis? My remarks are grouped into three sections: the first takes up the question of what motivated the controversy, and the second examines issues concerning the criteria for rigorous demonstration that played a central role throughout the dispute. The final section examines the consequences of the controversy.
THE DISPUTE IN ITS CONTEXT
The first thing that becomes evident in surveying the Hobbes -Wallis dispute is the fact that it was not a dispassionate search for the truth. This much is obvious from some of the harsh language employed by the disputants, with Wallis denouncing Hobbes's De corpore as a 'shitten piece' 4 and Hobbes complaining of the 'Levity and Scurrility' employed by Wallis while invoking 'Vespasians law', or the principle that good manners forbid one from initiating the use of harsh language, but there is no harm in replying in kind. 5 This level of invective shows that the participants in the dispute held quite passionately to their views, and it suggests that there was far more in play than the success or failure of a few geometric demonstrations. Indeed, issues in religion, church government and politics appear, along with lengthy exchanges over subtle points of grammar and philology.
One might be tempted to think that the mathematical aspects of the dispute were unimportant, so that at the most fundamental level the real issues were those concerning politics and religion. Viewed in this light, the controversy would have involved geometric matters almost by accident, and geometry would have mattered only to the extent that it provided the disputants a convenient arena in which to trade polemics. As I hope to show,
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there is little to be said in favour of such a reading of the controversy, for there were also matters of considerable mathematical significance at stake. Nevertheless, there is one respect in which this sort of approach gets things right: there were certainly social factors at work in the Hobbes -Wallis dispute, and we cannot hope to understand the controversy without attending to them.
In trying to determine what was ultimately at stake in this controversy, we can usefully begin by taking Huygens' question seriously: why, indeed, did Wallis go to the trouble of publishing lengthy and detailed refutations of Hobbes's geometric efforts? One might think that Wallis's decision to attack Hobbes's geometry could be explained entirely in terms of his quarrelsome temper. Wallis was, as Richard Westfall put it, 'a bellicose character engaged in endless quarrels and controversies'. 6 In fact, the catalogue of Wallis's polemical writings is quite extensive, covering all manner of natural-philosophical, mathematical and theological subjects. 7 There can be little question that Wallis relished the role of polemicist, but one should not think that his interest in the refutation of Hobbesian geometry was exclusively the consequence of his combative temper. It is noteworthy that the English theologian and natural philosopher Thomas White published a circle quadrature in his Exercitatio geometrica. De geometria indivisibilium, & proportione spiralis ad circulum.
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The level of argument in this piece was no better than anything to be found in Hobbes, but Wallis did not bother to attack it. 9 We are left to conclude that there was something significant in Hobbes's philosophy that motivated Wallis to engage in the lengthy and vitriolic denunciation of all things Hobbesian.
In point of fact, Wallis made no great secret of his motivations for attacking Hobbes's geometry, and the presence of theological and political motives is well attested in a 1659 letter to Huygens. He wrote:
But regarding the very harsh diatribe against Hobbes, the necessity of the case, and not my manners, led to it. For you see, as I believe, from other of my writings how peacefully I can differ with others and bear those with whom I differ. But this was provoked by our Leviathan (as can be easily gathered from his other writings, principally those in English), when he attacks with all his might and destroys our universities (and not only ours, but all, both old and new), and especially the clergy and all institutions and all religion. As if the Christian world knew nothing sound or nothing that was not ridiculous in philosophy or religion; and as if it has not understood religion because it does not understand philosophy, nor philosophy because it does not understand mathematics. And so it seemed necessary that now some mathematician, proceeding in the opposite direction, should show how little he understand this mathematics (from which he takes his courage). Nor should we be deterred from this by his arrogance, which we know will vomit poison and filth against us.
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Decades later Wallis offered a similar assessment of his motivations in the Preface to the first volume of his Opera mathematica: 'Certain works written long ago against Thomas Hobbes ( pseudo-geometer) will not be found here, for I would not want to seem to triumph over one now dead. Nevertheless, as things then stood, it was something that had to be done, when he had set himself up in the guise of a great geometer and dared to offer false suggestions to our unsuspecting youth in matters of religion.' 11 We can thus distinguish two issues that Wallis claimed as principally motivating his campaign against Hobbes: the role of the English universities and the status of the clergy (or, indeed, religion itself ). Beyond these two concerns, Wallis saw the refutation of Hobbes's geometry as a way to discredit his philosophy generally. Because Hobbes Context and consequences of the Hobbes -Wallis dispute insisted that his philosophy was grounded in fundamental truths that offered secure foundations for geometry, physics and politics, exposing his geometric failures would show the inadequacy of his system in toto.
Hobbes's political theory requires that the power of the civil sovereign be absolute and undivided. As a consequence, he held that universities must submit to the dictates of the sovereign in all matters. This extends, ironically enough, to geometry, since Hobbes notoriously claimed in Leviathan that the sovereign could ban the teaching of the subject and order 'the burning of all books of Geometry' if he should judge geometric principles 'a thing contrary to [his] right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion'. 12 Hobbes saw universities as critically important in inculcating the virtue of obedience to sovereign authority and he took it to be 'manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, upon the right teaching of Youth in the Universities'.
13 In Hobbes's estimation, the Civil War was in large measure a university-inspired conflict, and the preservation of order in the realm required that the universities at Oxford and Cambridge be reformed so as to purge them of false doctrines that promoted instability.
This critique of the universities was part of a broader debate over the status of the English university system in the aftermath of the Civil War. Puritan critics of the universities sought to align the educational system with the principles of true government and religion.
14 Like Hobbes, the Puritan reformers complained that the university curriculum was overly dependent on Scholastic and Aristotelian teachings that should be cast aside in favour of the 'new philosophy'. These reformers also shared Hobbes's view that traditional theology ('school divinity') was tainted by its association with Aristotelian philosophy. Matters had gone so far that in 1653 the Barebones Parliament entertained a proposal to abolish the universities altogether.
15 Although Hobbes was surely no radical Puritan, he and the reformers agreed that the universities could not be trusted to change their ways, so that state power must be employed to enforce a new educational order. 16 Wallis's colleague Seth Ward (Savilian Professor of Astronomy) took up the cause of defending the universities in 1654 with his Vindiciae academiarum. He published the tract anonymously, principally in reply to the Academiarum examen of the Puritan reformer John Webster, but he also included two appendices, one directed at the writings of the reformer William Dell and the other responding to Hobbes. The appearance of Ward's Vindiciae academiarum precipitated Hobbes's dispute with Wallis, although Wallis himself had no part in its publication. Evidently seeking to goad Hobbes into making public his supposed circle quadratures and suspecting the lamentable state of his geometric efforts, Ward dared the philosopher from Malmesbury to present his geometric results to the learned world.
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In the course of events, Ward proved prescient. When Hobbes's De corpore appeared, its twentieth chapter contained a supposed circle quadrature that had been hastily revised multiple times even as the book was being printed, as well as several intemperate passages directed against Ward, under the name 'Vindex' (in allusion to his authorship of the Vindiciae academiarum). The level of geometric argument in this chapter was as poor and riddled with paralogisms as Ward had anticipated when he predicted that he would be 'able to find a great number in the University, who will understand as much or more of [Hobbes's geometrical pieces] then he desires they should, indeed too much to keep up in them that Admiration of him which only will content him'.
horror at the thought that the civil sovereign could order 'the Publicke reading of [Hobbes's] Leviathan in the Universities'. 19 Both men held that the universities were fully capable of exercising their proper educational function without excessive external interference from the state: no subversive doctrines were taught, the authority of Aristotle was hardly absolute and the new science was an object of intense study. This project nevertheless required a sort of conceptual balancing act because both Savilian professors had been intruded into their chairs by the Parliamentary visitation in 1649. They consequently owed their positions to an exercise of sovereign power that (in their assessment) was no longer warranted in the 1650s. To whatever extent Hobbes's critique of the universities might seem persuasive to a contemporary reader, Wallis was motivated to show that the Hobbesian programme was an amalgam of error and fallacy. Hobbes's geometry was therefore a tempting target for Wallis's attack.
Hobbes's conception of sovereignty has consequences for church government that parallel those for the universities. English debates over church polity in the 1650s were dominated by the conflict between two models: the Presbyterian and the Independent. Presbyterian ecclesiology places the church under the authority of a body of ministers and elders-the presbytery-who are granted their authority directly from God and do not answer to the civil sovereign. In contrast, the Independents held that the freely-gathered congregation was the true model of the New Testament church, and they opposed the imposition of a national ecclesiastical structure, whether in Presbyterian or Anglican form. By placing the church and its organization under the control of the civil sovereign, Hobbes decisively rejected the central tenet of Presbyterianism. The issue had particular significance at Oxford, where John Owen (a leading Independent) had been appointed Vice-Chancellor of the university in 1652. The issue of church governance was far from settled in the 1650s, and Wallis was an active participant in debates concerning it, defending Presbyterian ecclesiology and attacking the scriptural basis for Independency. 20 As a Presbyterian minister and Doctor of Divinity, Wallis therefore found abundant reason to reject Hobbes's political theory.
Hobbes's metaphysics provided still more to provoke Wallis's antipathy. Hobbes embraced a thoroughgoing materialism that was difficult to reconcile with any traditional notion of the Deity, and he was widely suspected of endorsing principles that implied atheism, even though he frequently insisted that his views were in conformity with the tenets of Protestant Christianity. 21 Wallis and the proponents of traditional theology held that God is to be understood as an essentially immaterial spirit, radically distinct from the world of material bodies. In Leviathan Hobbes notoriously declared that the expression immaterial substance is insignificant because it combines 'two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent', 22 while also insisting 'that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently no where'.
23 To Wallis and other religious traditionalists, this could only mean 'that you deny (and not just in words) not only angels, and immortal souls, but also the great and good God Himself'. 24 Hobbes reserved some of his harshest words for the proponents of 'school divinity', or professors, like Wallis, who worked out subtle theories on the nature of God and the relationship between God and the world. School divines, Hobbes held, are agents of the 'Kingdome of Darknesse' whose doctrines are an amalgam of false and pernicious philosophy that rest on 'canting and fraud', the intent of which is 'to entangle shallow wits' and mislead them. 25 If Hobbes had his way, Doctors of Divinity such as Wallis would be cast out of the universities and their teachings would be outlawed.
Context and consequences of the Hobbes -Wallis dispute
In sum, Wallis saw Hobbes and his philosophy as a threat, not merely to his livelihood but to his entire vision of a well-ordered society. If Hobbes's doctrines were allowed to go unchallenged, the consequences for religious belief, political stability and his own position were potentially catastrophic. Yet, Wallis also found himself in something of a delicate position. He was, after all, a proponent of the 'new philosophy' that sought to supplant the traditional AristotelianScholastic approach to nature. As a visible exponent of the mathematics, mechanics and astronomy associated with the 'moderns' against the traditionalists, 26 Wallis needed to show that the benefits of the new philosophy could be had without danger to piety and true religion. As his associate Joseph Glanvill would put the matter in 1665, it was alarming that 'divers of the brisker Geniusses, who desire rather to be accounted Witts, then endeavour to be so, have been willing to accept Mechanism upon Hobbian conditions, and many others were in danger of following them into the precipice'. 27 The corrective to such a danger lay in showing that the mechanistic principles of the new philosophy could be harmonized with traditional Christian teaching, so that 'the meanest intellects may perceive, that Mechanick Philosophy yields no security to irreligion, and that those that would be gentilely learned, and ingenious, need not purchase it, at the dear rate of being Atheists'.
28 Thinkers such as Wallis and Glanvill opted to confine mechanism to the material world, leaving the non-physical realm of God and the soul beyond the reach of the 'mechanical philosophy'. Hobbes, in contrast, held that the material world is the only world, so he opted for a (highly controversial) reading of the Scriptures in which neither God nor the soul is an immaterial substance.
Sensitive to the difficulty of showing that embracing the mechanistic new philosophy did not require a commitment to thoroughgoing materialism of the Hobbesian sort, Wallis undertook the refutation of Hobbes's geometry as a way of showing that the philosopher from Malmesbury lacked the intellectual standing to hold forth on weighty matters of religion or politics. One could phrase this by saying that the struggle over questions in geometry was in many respects a struggle for intellectual authority. By refuting Hobbes's geometry, Wallis hoped to show that the Hobbesian philosophy was rotten to the core, and that 'whoever stumbles so horribly in geometry, where demonstrative proofs have a place, can hardly be thought to walk more securely in other matters'. 29 In the letter of dedication to the Elenchus, he made a similar point, claiming that once Hobbes's geometry had been refuted, 'that man, so full of airy talk, might be quite deflated and others, less skilled in geometry, may know that there is nothing more to be feared from this Leviathan'.
HOBBES AND WALLIS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
Although the dispute between Hobbes and Wallis was ignited by conflicts involving the universities and questions of church governance, it persisted long after these had been largely resolved with the restoration of the Stuart monarchy. When Charles II assumed the throne in 1660, the radicals' threat to the universities had passed.
31 Likewise, the struggles over church organization were essentially settled with the 1662 Act of Uniformity. The Restoration did not, however, put an end to the conflict between Hobbes and Wallis, as their exchange of polemics continued well in to the 1670s. 32 Much of this debate concerned foundational issues in mathematics, most notably the criteria for rigorous demonstration. In the course of the dispute it became clear that Hobbes and Wallis had widely diverging conceptions of mathematics, and it can help to illuminate their dispute by examining their competing accounts of the metaphysics and method of mathematics.
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From Greek Antiquity onward, mathematics was traditionally seen as a science whose objects are fundamentally distinct from those of ordinary experience. According to this view, material bodies may approximate the lines, figures and solids of geometry, but the truths of mathematics concern abstract entities different in kind from material bodies. In the Aristotelian tradition, the objects of mathematical investigation are held to be abstracted or mentally separated from material things. The first two definitions in Euclid's Elements exemplify this theme. 33 The line, defined as 'Length without breadth', was typically understood as an abstraction in which the concept of length is mentally separated from breadth; likewise, the point 'That which has no part' is an abstraction in which the concept of a part is stripped away from that of an object. As the sixteenthcentury Jesuit geometer Christopher Clavius explained: '[n]o example [of a point] can be found in material things, unless you mean that the extremity of the sharpest needle expresses some similitude to a point; which nevertheless is wholly untrue, since this extremity can be divided and cut to infinity, but a point must be supposed altogether indivisible.' 34 Wallis accepted this general account, claiming in the first chapter of his Mathesis Universalis that 'We call those parts of mathematics pure in which quantity is considered absolutely, so far as it is abstracted from matter'. 35 Hobbes based his approach to mathematics on his distinctively materialist principles and identified the objects of mathematics with material bodies. Where Euclid and the tradition had understood points, lines and surfaces as abstracted from the realm of matter, Hobbes declared:
Though there be no Body which has not some Magnitude, yet if when any Body is moved, the Magnitude of it be not at all considered, the way it makes is called a LINE, or one single Dimension; & the Space through which it passeth is called LENGTH; and the Body itself a POINT; in which sense the Earth is Called a Point, and the Way of its yearly Revolution, the Ecliptick Line.
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Thus, a Hobbesian point is a material body sufficiently small that its magnitude can be neglected in a demonstration; the path traced by a moving point is a line or curve, and a surface is traced by a moving line. Such points have magnitude and are divisible, although their size and divisibility are disregarded in the course of a demonstration.
Wallis poured scorn on this doctrine, asking: 'Who ever, before you, defined a point to be a body? Who ever seriously asserted that points have any magnitude?' 37 In Wallis's view, Hobbes's materialistic foundation for geometry (and, indeed, mathematics generally) fails to account for the abstract, immaterial nature of mathematical objects, which excludes 'corporeity' or a dependence upon the structure and contents of the material world.
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A recurring theme in Wallis's polemics against Hobbes is that his system has no place for immaterial objects such as God, angels or the soul. Further, he held that this dogmatic commitment to materialism has made Hobbes incapable of understanding the nature of mathematics and its demonstrations, which are not confined to the realm of material objects. Hobbes retorted that Wallis's approach amounted to the doctrine that 'a point is nothing', which he took to imply that, on Wallis's principles, there could be no proper science of geometry.
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These differences over the nature of mathematical objects also led to a fundamental difference of opinion on the criteria for rigorous mathematical demonstration. According to a tradition that traces back to the Aristotelian Posterior Analytics, proper demonstrations must be based on premises that are true, better known than the conclusion and expressing the causes that bring about the conclusion. This doctrine raised some questions in the case of mathematical Context and consequences of the Hobbes -Wallis dispute 475 demonstrations, since it is not immediately clear how such demonstrations might employ causes. As a result, there was a significant discussion in the sixteenth and seventeenth century of whether mathematics could satisfy the criteria for Aristotelian science. 40 Wallis defended the causality of mathematical demonstrations, arguing in his Mathesis universialis that mathematical definitions specify the essences of the things defined, so that conclusions follow 'immediately as from a true and proximate cause'. 41 This kind of causality was understood as 'formal causality', in which the form or essence of the defined object functions as the cause of the derived conclusions. As Isaac Barrow (the Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge) put it in the sixth of his 1664 Lectiones mathematicae:
In truth, such, and no otherwise, is the causality and mutual dependence of the terms of a mathematical demonstration, namely a most close and intimate connection of them with one another; which may yet be called a formal causality, since the remaining affections result from that one property first assumed, as from a form. 42 Hobbes was emphatic in his support for the thesis that mathematical demonstrations must be causal, but he rejected the notion of 'formal causality' as an incoherent bit of Aristotelian metaphysics that should be abandoned. In his scheme, only mechanical causes (i.e. matter and motion) are admissible. Because he took geometric objects to be material bodies, and motion to be the only cause, Hobbes concluded that proper demonstrations must proceed from definitions that specify the motions that generate figures, angles or solids. 43 In the twelfth chapter of the tract De principiis et ratiocinatione geometrarum he outlined his reasoning:
All demonstrations are flawed, unless they produce knowledge, and unless they proceed from causes, they do not produce knowledge. Further, demonstrations are flawed unless their conclusions are demonstrated by construction, that is, by the description of figures, that is, by the drawing of lines. For every drawing of a line is motion: and so every demonstration is flawed, whose first principles do not contain the definitions of motions by which figures are described. 44 This doctrine found no favour with Wallis, who frequently complained that Hobbes's principles are 'plainly physical' and far removed from the true understanding of mathematics. 45 Hobbes took this conception of demonstration to the extreme of insisting that algebraic or arithmetical calculation are irrelevant to the status of a geometric result. In his view, the process of 'drawing lines into lines' that generates a surface is an essentially geometric operation that cannot be identified with algebraic or arithmetical multiplication. When others refuted his supposed geometric results through calculations showing that, for instance, his results conflicted with the established Archimedean bounds for p, Hobbes responded by declaring that such bounds were calculated by an illegitimate intrusion of algebra into geometry. Thus, reliance on trigonometric tables could never impugn a geometric demonstration. Discussing the objections that Wallis and others had raised to one of his supposed circle quadratures, Hobbes declared: But this was opposed by the said professors, in part from the tables of sines, tangents, and secants, and in part from the authority of Archimedes. Yet because those tables were constructed by the multiplication of lines by numbers (whose product they falsely computed as a number of squares), and by the extraction of roots from those squares (which roots they falsely computed as a number of lines), the argument taken from those tables has no refutative force. And since Archimedes himself demonstrates his Douglas Jesseph dimension of the circle by the extraction of roots, his authority need not weigh in this matter. 46 His obstinate insistence on this conception of geometric demonstration as essentially nonalgebraic made Hobbes impervious to the shortcomings in his own geometric work and was catastrophic for his entire mathematical programme. Indeed, as previously mentioned, he found himself forced to reject the Pythagorean Theorem in order (as he imagined) to defend his geometric efforts against refutation. 47 The divergent conceptions of mathematical demonstration that separated Hobbes and Wallis can be further illustrated in their reaction to the 'method of indivisibles' introduced by the Italian mathematician Bonaventura Cavalieri in his 1637 Geometria inidivisibilibus continuorum nova quadam ratione promota. Both Hobbes and Wallis accepted the method and employed it, but they held very different views about its foundation and ultimate justification.
The method is rooted in the intuition that we can reason about the relative areas of two figures by considering 'all the lines' contained in them. If we take the circle ABCD and the oblong figure EFGH of equal height (figure 1), we can consider the common tangent LM and let it pass through the two figures to arrive in the position IK. In Cavalieri's parlance, the passage of the line LM (which he termed the 'regula') produces 'all the lines' of 'the indivisibles' of the figures. 48 Cavalieri's procedure takes indivisibles to comprise a new kind of magnitude that could be treated in accordance with the traditional doctrine of ratios. 49 To determine the ratio of the areas of two curvilinear figures, he introduced postulates concerning the relations between indivisibles of figures. Thus, he postulated that the indivisibles of congruent figures are equal; that if figure F 1 is a proper part of F 2 , then the indivisibles of F 1 are less than those of F 2 ; and if figure F 1 can be decomposed into figures F 2 and F 3 , the indivisibles of F 1 are equal to the sum of the indivisibles of F 2 and F 3 . Cavalieri's basic procedure was to establish a ratio between the indivisibles of two figures, and then to conclude that the areas of the figures stand to one another in the same ratio as their indivisibles. In his words:
It is clear from this that when we want to find what ratio two plane figures or two solids have to one another, it is sufficient for us to find what ratio all the lines of the figure stand in (and in the case of solids, what ratio holds between all of the planes), relative to a given regula, which I lay as the great foundation of my new geometry. 
Context and consequences of the Hobbes -Wallis dispute
This is the basis for the theorem that has become known as 'Cavalieri's principle': when two figures have equal altitudes and sections made by lines parallel to their bases at equal distances stand in a given ratio, the areas of the figures also stand in that ratio.
Cavalieri insisted that his method did not treat figures as literally composed from lines, and thus did not encounter the notorious difficulties of composing the continuum from indivisible parts. His successors, however, were far less cautious on this point. Wallis, in particular, opened his 1656 De Sectionibus conicis nova methodo expositis Tractatus by declaring: 'I suppose, to begin with, (according to the Geometry of Indivisibles of Bonaventura Cavalieri) any plane to be made up (so to speak) out of an infinity of parallel lines; or (which I prefer) from an infinity of parallelograms of the same altitude. Let the altitude of any one of them be 1/1 of the whole . . . and the altitude of all together being equal to the altitude of the figure. ' 51 In his Arithmetica infinitorum (also published in 1656) Wallis approached geometric problems by using infinite series summations to determine the areas of figures, taking the figure to be an infinite sum of infinitesimal elements. To solve the problem of determining the area enclosed by the cubic parabola, he proceeded by comparing ratios of sums of cubic numbers, beginning with the observation that
From these initial cases, Wallis concluded 'by induction' that in the infinite case the ratio of an infinite sum of increasing cubic numbers to an infinite sum of cubes equalling the greatest of those cubes must be exactly 1:4. Then, taking the cubic parabola as an infinite sum of lines that increase as the cubic power (i.e. as x 3 ) on the interval AT (figure 2), and comparing it to a rectangle composed of an infinite sum of lines equal to the final value TO, he concluded:
Therefore the whole figure AOT (Consisting of the infinity of straight lines TO, TO &c. in triplicate ratio of the arithmetically proportional straight lines AT, AT, &c.) will be to the parallelogram TD (consisting of just as many lines all equal to TO) as one to four, Which was to be shown. And consequently, the semiparabola AOD (the residuum of the parallelogram) is to the parallelogram itself as one to four. 52 This approach is difficult to reconcile with traditional standards of rigorous demonstration, both because it relies on a problematic 'induction' to the infinite case from a few initial instances and because it takes finite geometric magnitudes to be infinite sums of indivisible, infinitesimal elements. Wallis was content to claim that, properly understood, the method was nothing more than a notational variant of classical techniques, 53 but this pretence is difficult to take seriously.
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Hobbes's attitude toward the method of indivisibles was more complex. On the one hand, he denounced Wallis's use of it, as when he dismissed the Savilian professor's inductions: 'Egregious Logicians and Geometricians, that think an Induction without a Numeration of all the particulars sufficient to infer a Conclusion universal, and fit to be received for a Geometricall Demonstration!' 54 He also argued that Wallis's doctrines destroyed the only possible foundation of the method of indivisibles: you think it will pass for current, without proof, that a Point is nothing. Which if it do, Geometry also shall pass for nothing, as having no ground nor beginning but in nothing. But I have already in a former Lesson sufficiently shew'd you the consequence of that opinion. To which I may add, that it destroys the method of Indivisibles, invented by Bonaventura; and upon which, not well understood, you have grounded all your scurvy book of Arithmetica Infinitorum; where your Indivisibles have nothing to do, but as they are supposed to have Quantity, that is to say, to be Divisibles 55 Hobbes insisted that there could be no proper reasoning based on the notion of an infinitely large or infinitely small quantity, and therefore rejected Wallis's methods as misguided and fallacious. 56 In the face of such criticisms, one might conclude that Hobbes opposed the method of indivisibles tout court. However, a closer look at the evidence shows that Hobbes thought the method was rigorously demonstrative when interpreted against the background of his materialistic ontology for mathematics. Moreover, he actually used the method of indivisibles in the attempt to determine the areas of curvilinear figures.
Hobbes held that the key to the method of indivisibles was to adopt his understanding of points, lines and planes. Taking points as extended bodies whose magnitude can be neglected allows a line or curve to be literally composed of (finitely extended) points. Likewise, taking a Context and consequences of the Hobbes -Wallis dispute straight line to be a parallelogram of determinate length but negligible (yet still extended) breadth enables the composition of plane figures from collections of lines. As he explained in the second dialogue of his 1660 Examinatio et emendatio mathematicae hodiernae:
Those things that can exceed one another when multiplied are homogenous, and these are measureable by a measure of the same kind, as lines are measurable by lines, surfaces by surfaces, and solids by solids. However, things heterogeneous are measured by different kinds of measures. Nevertheless, if lines are considered as the most minute parallelograms, as they are considered by those who use the method of demonstration that Bonaventura Cavalieri calls the doctrine of Indivisibles, then there will be a ratio between a straight line and a plane surface. And indeed such lines, when multiplied, can exceed any given finite plane surface. 57 Thus, Hobbes held that taking points to be extensionless 'nothings' or lines to be breadthless lengths makes it impossible to use the method; but he saw his own materialistic foundations for geometry as putting indivisibles on a secure foundation that avoids the use of infinitesimals and delivers correct results.
In the seventeenth chapter of De corpore Hobbes adopted the method of indivisibles and used it to find the areas of figures that he termed 'deficient'. 58 In his terminology, the deficient figure ABEFC is made by the motion of the line AB as it moves toward CD, diminishing continually until it vanishes at point C. The complement of the deficient figure is BDCFE, and the sum of the deficient figure and its complement will be the rectangle ABDC. The area of the figure is determined by the rate of diminution: if the rate is completely uniform, the diagonal BC results and the ratio of deficient figure to its complement will be 1:1. Where the rate of diminution is not uniform, a curvilinear figure will result. Hobbes's task in the seventeenth chapter is to establish a general rule for computing the ratio of the area of a deficient figure to its complement, given a specified rate of diminution. The central theorem is stated in the second article of chapter 17:
A Deficient Figure which is made by a Quantity continually decreasing to nothing by proportions every where proportionall and commensurable, is to its Complement, as the proportion of the whole altitude, to an altitude diminished in any time, is to the proportion of the whole Quantity which describes the Figure, to the same Quantity diminished in the same time. 59 Thus, if the line AB (figure 3) decreases as the square of the diminished altitude, the area of the deficient figure will be twice that of the complement. And, more generally, if the line AB decreases as the nth power, the ratio of the deficient figure to its complement will be n:1. The critical step in Hobbes's argument is to take the deficient figure ABEFC to be composed of all the lines parallel to AB (such as HF and GE) while its complement is composed of all the lines parallel to BD (such as QF and OE).
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What emerges from this investigation is that the Hobbes -Wallis controversy involved significant differences over mathematical method and the criteria for proper demonstration. Thus, the conflict went beyond certain technical errors in Hobbes's supposed geometric results, nor was it simply a quarrel about the status of English universities or the limits of sovereign power in matters of religion. It should be noted that Hobbes's mathematical programme had certain strengths. His rejection of Wallis's use of infinitesimal magnitudes and his problematic 'inductions' to the infinite case comport well with traditional standards of rigorous demonstration. On the other hand, his attempted Douglas Jesseph demonstrations of important results almost invariably involve fallacious reasoning, and his rejection of algebraic methods condemned his mathematics to failure.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISPUTE
The most salient result of this long-running dispute was the demolition of Hobbes's reputation as a geometer. He had clearly hoped to establish himself as one of the great mathematicians of Europe by delivering long-sought solutions to central problems, yet his efforts on this front ensnared him in a mass of self-contradiction and incoherence. This is best evidenced by the fact that his various circle quadratures yield quite different results-so that if the reasoning behind any one of them were ( per impossible) true, the rest would be destroyed; 61 yet Hobbes insisted that they were all correct and properly demonstrated. 62 Beyond this, Hobbes found himself jettisoning established mathematical results such as the Pythagorean Theorem in the vain attempt to shield his supposed circle quadratures from refutation.
Hobbes also failed to win any adherents to his thoroughly materialistic conception of geometry. The programme of De corpore, which understands geometric objects as literal physical bodies endowed with magnitude, was disregarded by philosophers and philosophically-minded geometers in the seventeenth century. This is despite the fact that some of Hobbes's criticisms of Wallis's use of indivisibles were generally on the mark. Wallis's introduction of infinitesimal elements and his practice of relying on shaky 'inductions' from a few initial cases are impossible to reconcile with traditional criteria for rigorous demonstration. Yet these methods were never seriously called into question, while Hobbes's mathematics was almost universally ignored. Thus, if we think of the dispute in purely mathematical terms, Wallis emerges as the clear winner. 
Context and consequences of the Hobbes -Wallis dispute
Nevertheless, there is an odd irony here. For all that Wallis could triumph over Hobbes's mathematical efforts, he did not succeed in his principal goal of destroying Hobbes's reputation as a philosopher and political theorist. Hobbes is still read widely today, and his importance for political philosophy is undeniable. Wallis, although hardly an obscure figure, never attained the degree of influence that Hobbes had over subsequent generations of theorists. As we have seen, Wallis was convinced that the refutation of Hobbesian geometry was the way to refute Hobbes's entire philosophy, but in this he was very much disappointed. Thus, if we keep score by asking which of our two combatants had the greater impact on the development of European intellectual history, it seems that Hobbes came out the winner.
Further, Hobbes himself saw his political philosophy as intimately connected to his theory of demonstration, and he accepted Wallis's contention that a refutation of his geometry would be catastrophic for his political theory. He notoriously claimed that both civil philosophy and geometry are demonstrable sciences, since we know the causes that bring about both civil institutions and mathematical objects.
63 Indeed, this is precisely why Hobbes insisted on maintaining the adequacy of his false quadratures and other failed results. To have admitted defeat on this front would have entailed, at least in his mind, the outright demolition of his entire system of philosophy.
The irony is that readers of both Hobbes and Wallis seem not to have shared this view of Hobbes's philosophical project. Hobbes's reputation as a philosopher and political theorist survived, but it did so because his readers were prepared to disregard his claims to have delivered a systematic, unified treatment of first philosophy, geometry, natural philosophy and politics. Citizens of the seventeenth-century Republic of Letters were prepared to detach Hobbes's geometry from his political theory, and in doing so they made his geometric defeat far less significant than it would otherwise have been. In other words, Hobbes's intellectual reputation survived his battle with Wallis, but it did so because his readers took his philosophy in a manner rather different from what its author had intended. The quadrature or squaring of the circle is the problem of constructing a square equal in area to a given circle; the problem of arbitrary angular section is to divide a given angle into any number of equal angles; the duplication of the cube is the problem of constructing a cube double in volume to a given cube. These are all now known to be unsolvable with the resources of Euclidean geometry. 
